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Causality and coextensiveness in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1.13 
Lucas Angioni, University of Campinas 
I. Introduction: 
I discuss an important feature of the notion of cause in Posterior Analytics (henceforth APo) 
1.13, 78b13-28. Some scholars have taken the passage as introducing a false principle about 
explanation  (or even a fallacy of conversion) . I claim that Aristotle is introducing a logical 1 2
requirement for being the strictly appropriate cause in a scientific demonstration, namely: an 
appropriate cause must be coextensive with what it appropriately explains. Some interpretations go 
in this direction, but do not account for the intricacies of the text and, furthermore, do not explain 
how Aristotle goes beyond negative causes expressed in the second-figure syllogisms. My 
interpretation provides a careful and full discussion of the intricate steps in which Aristotle presents 
the requirement. Furthermore, I argue that the requirement is completely consistent with an 
important feature of Aristotle’s notion of scientific explanation, namely, his insistence on katholou 
predications as understood in APo 1.4, 73b26-74a3. 
The underlying subject in this paper is the notion of cause understood as one of the key 
notions involved in Aristotle’s conception of scientific knowledge at APo. For easiness of reference, 
I will use the expression “primary cause” to refer to it. I will not examine here Aristotle’s general 
 See J. Barnes, Posterior Analytics [Posterior] (Oxford, 1993), 157; see also the bewilderment in M. Mignucci, 1
Aristotele - Analitici Secondi [Analitici] (Roma-Bari, 2007), 197.
 Philoponus, in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora Commentaria [Commentaria], M. Wallies (ed.), Berlin, 1909, 2
174.34-175.4, exempts Aristotle of such a charge of fallacy of conversion. His diagnosis is correct: Aristotle is focusing 
on the relationships between causes and effects (cf. 175.4-13).
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views on causes, or how it differs from other conceptions, such as the Humean one.  As for what 3
‘cause’ signifies for him, I will assume that a cause for Aristotle is a real-world item (either a 
substance’s attribute, or a state of affairs, or a things’ essence, or an event etc.) which grounds 
another real-world item – which makes it what it is. Perhaps “ground” would be better than “cause” 
as a translation for aition, but for simplicity’s sake I will stick with the word “cause”.  4
The notion of causality in Aristotle’s theory of demonstration is cast within the triadic 
framework of syllogisms: a cause is expressed as a middle term (B) which explains why a given 
attribute (A) is present in a given subject (C).  Aristotle’s talk about causes can be very misleading, 5
for sometimes (as in Physics 2.3 or Metaphysics 5.2) he does not make explicit the triadic structure 
of causal relations and, more importantly for the purposes of this paper, he seems to give different 
criteria for sorting out what counts as a relevant explanandum: sometimes the explanandum is 
explicitly introduced as the relation between a subject and a predicate, sometimes Aristotle seems to 
take the predicate as the explanandum.  I cannot address this complicated question here. But, as it is 6
 For more general accounts of Aristotle’s notion of cause, which address many of those issues, see J. M. Moravcsik, 3
‘Aristotle on Adequate Explanations’, Synthese, 28 (1974), 3-17; J. M. Moravcsik, ‘What Makes Reality Intelligible? 
Reflections on Aristotle’s Theory of Aitia’ [‘Aitia’], in L. Judson, L. (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics (Oxford, 1991), 31-47;  M. 
Hocutt, ‘Aristotle’s four becauses’, Philosophy 49 (1974), 93-110; N. Stein, ‘Causation and Explanation in Aristotle’, 
Philosophy Compass 6/10 (2011), 699-707 and N. Stein, ‘Aristotle’s Causal Pluralism’ [‘Pluralism’], Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2011), 121-147. 
 See R. McKirahan, Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science [‘Principles’] (Princeton, 4
1992), 2-3, 167, 231-2, for “ground” as translation for aitia or aition (my inspiration is not the current fashion about 
grounding in contemporary metaphysics). Many prefer “explanation” as a translation for aitia (see Barnes, Posterior, 
89). I stick with the traditional “cause” just for the sake of simplifying my discussion. Another option will be to 
transliterate aitia and aition (see Moravcsik,‘Aitia’). I cannot address in this paper the discussion about what is involved 
or implied in each translation.
 The notion of cause as middle term is officially presented in APo 90a5-11 and is found throughout Aristotle’s 5
discussion of demonstration (especially APo 1.13 and 2.16-17, but also 75a34-7, 80b20-2, 84b19-28, 89a16, 93a29ff., 
94a20-24, 95a11-12). Aristotle is also concerned with the triadic framework for causes in Metaphysics 7.17. Cf. D. 
Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford, 2000), 37, 285-94; D. Charles, ‘Definition and Explanation in 
Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics’, in id., Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford, 2010), 286-328; S. Williams & D. 
Charles “Essence, Modality and the Master Craftsman”, in E. Feser (ed.), Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics (New 
York, 2013), 121-145 at 123.
 The more articulated story which prevails in Aristotle’s analysis is the following: the B-term being the cause as a 6
middle term, the A-term is treated as “that of which the cause is cause” in contrast with the C-term as “that for which the 
cause is cause” (99a17-18). Aristotle sometimes says or suggests that the conclusion of a syllogism (as a predicative 
fact AC) is that of which the cause is cause (71b22, 64b10, 70a9), and sometimes he uses the word pragma as equivalent 
to the A-term (98b30), but sometimes pragma refers to an explanandum with predicative form (71b11). For a different 
view about pragma, see D. Bronstein, Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning [Learning] (Oxford, 2016), 54-6.
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important for my purposes to focus on the logical relations between the B-term and the A-term as 
attributes of a given subject, I will prefer to take A as the “effect”  or that of which the cause is 7
cause.   
I cannot go into details about Aristotle’s notion of scientific demonstration, including whether 
it has an axiomatic model, or how we should understand the role of necessity, and principles, and 
per se predications, except to the extent they figure in my interpretation of the passage that 
constitutes my main focus. I will briefly indicate some assumptions that are indispensable for my 
points.  
First of all, it is important to get clear about what is exactly the object of the definition 
Aristotle is giving at APo 1.2, 71b9-12. I take the definiendum to be a higher-level form of 
knowledge that can be labelled scientific knowledge. Thus, Aristotle is not concerned with giving 
an analysis of the general concept of knowledge. I line up with those that take Aristotle’s object as 
the notion of scientific understanding.  But, more particularly, Aristotle is not ultimately concerned 8
with explicating what a body of full scientific knowledge amounts to; he is ultimately concerned 
with explicating what – within such a body of knowledge – is the most important factor that makes 
it so special and puts it on a higher-level. And this factor, as Aristotle will develop as he goes on in 
APo, is the explanation through the most appropriate cause. Now, appropriate explanation in this 
context is not mere justification. Appropriate explanation involves the identification of real-world 
items that are primarily responsible for making their explananda what they are. Aristotle is aware 
that it is really hard to find explanations that count as the appropriate ones (76a26-30), but he is 
 I use “effect” just for brevity’s sake. What I mean by “effect” is just the A-term or a predicative explanandum (A-C).7
 See L. A. Kosman ‘Explanation, Understanding and Insight in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics’, in H. Lee, A. 8
Mourelatos, R. Rorty, (eds.) Exegesis and Argument, (Assen, 1973), 374-92; J. H. Lesher, ‘Aristotle on ἐπιστήµη as 
understanding’, Ancient Philosophy 21 (2001), 45-55; M. F. Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge’, in E. 
Berti (ed.), Aristotle on Science – The Posterior Analytics, (Padova, 1981), 97-140; Bronstein, [Learning]. My overall 
view about the theory of demonstration in APo is closer to McKirahan, [Principles], 209-34 and M. Ferejohn, Formal 
Causes [Formal], (Oxford, 2013), 64-120. See L. Angioni, ‘Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge (APo 
71b9-12)’ [‘Definition’], Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 19 (2016), 79-105, and L. Angioni, ‘Aristotle on 
Necessary Principles and on Explaining X Through the Essence of X’, Studia Philosophica Estonica 7.2 (2014), 
88-112.
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interested in explicating in what they consist. Now, one important ingredient of the notion of an 
appropriate explanation is the notion of reciprocation between cause and effect: being a primary 
cause that delivers the appropriate explanation of its effect involves (but does not collapse into) 
being a necessary and sufficient condition for its effect to obtain. When this reciprocation is cast 
within the syllogistic framework of demonstrations, the result is (besides other things) that the 
middle term encapsulating the cause is coextensive with the major term it is meant to explain.  
Now, on my view, the passage APo 1.13, 78b13-28 is exactly advancing such a point: a 
primary cause must be coextensive with its effect. Aristotle’s phrasing in 78b13-28 is complicated 
and perhaps convoluted. The few discussions that we find about it in the literature are not 
satisfactory: they either disconnect the passage from the previous discussion about primary causes 
and so attribute to Aristotle a false principle about explanation in general (Barnes, Posterior, 157), 
or they do see the connection between coextensiveness and primary (or proximate) causes, but fail 
at explaining how Aristotle’s point is a general one about scientific demonstrations and is not 
restricted to the negative causes expressed in second-figure syllogisms (for instance, Philoponus, 
Commentaria, W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics [Analytics] (Oxford, 1949), 557 
and McKirahan, Principles, 214). Thus, in offering a careful discussion of each step in the passage 
78b13-28, my aim is to show how Aristotle is coherently advancing a general point about primary 
causes which is not restricted either to negative cases or to second-figure syllogisms: primary 
causes must be coextensive with their effects. This picture also helps us to understand Aristotle’s 
insistence on katholou predications and hence to attain a more coherent and unified interpretation 
about the overall theory of scientific demonstrations presented in APo. 
II. Examination of the key-passage 78b13-28: 
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I will divide the passage into five sections and refer to it as T1. I start with a neutral 
translation (based on Barnes’s), then I will discuss each section and eventually present a different 
translation in due course:  9
T1 
[1] καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τοῦ ὅτι καὶ οὐ τοῦ διότι ἡ ἀπόδειξις· οὐ 
γὰρ λέγεται τὸ αἴτιον. οἷον διὰ τί οὐκ ἀναπνεῖ ὁ τοῖχος; 
ὅτι οὐ ζῷον. [2] εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦ µὴ ἀναπνεῖν αἴτιον, ἔδει τὸ 
ζῷον εἶναι αἴτιον τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν, [3a] οἷον εἰ ἡ ἀπόφασις αἰτία τοῦ 
µὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ κατάφασις τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, [3a*] ὥσπερ εἰ τὸ ἀσύµ- 
µετρα εἶναι τὰ θερµὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ τοῦ µὴ ὑγιαίνειν, τὸ 
σύµµετρα εἶναι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν,  – [3b] ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ κατάφα- 
σις τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ ἀπόφασις τοῦ µὴ ὑπάρχειν. [4] ἐπὶ δὲ 
τῶν οὕτως ἀποδεδοµένων οὐ συµβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν· οὐ γὰρ 
ἅπαν ἀναπνεῖ ζῷον. [5] ὁ δὲ συλλογισµὸς γίνεται τῆς τοιαύ- 
της αἰτίας ἐν τῷ µέσῳ σχήµατι. οἷον ἔστω τὸ Α ζῷον, ἐφ' 
ᾧ Β τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, ἐφ' ᾧ Γ τοῖχος. τῷ µὲν οὖν Β παντὶ 
ὑπάρχει τὸ Α (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀναπνέον ζῷον), τῷ δὲ Γ οὐ- 
θενί, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ Β τῷ Γ οὐθενί· οὐκ ἄρα ἀναπνεῖ ὁ τοῖ- 
χος. (78b14-28). 
[1] “For also in these cases the [attempted] demonstration is of the fact that but not of the 
reason why, for the cause is not stated. For instance: why do walls not breathe? Because walls are 
not animals. [2] If this were the cause of not breathing, being an animal would have to be the cause 
of breathing, [3a] i.e., if the negation is the cause of something’s not being attributed, then the 
 The Greek text is from Ross, Analytics. 9
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affirmation is the cause of its being attributed (thus if an imbalance of the hot and cold elements is 
the cause of not being healthy, their balance is the cause of being healthy), [3b] and, similarly, if the 
affirmation is the cause of something’s being attributed, then the negation is the cause of its not 
being attributed. [4] But what was said does not obtain in the cases introduced (or explained) in that 
way: indeed, not every animal breathes. [5] The syllogism of this sort of cause comes about in the 
middle figure, e.g., let A be animal, B breathing, C wall. A holds of every B (for everything which 
breathes is an animal), but of no C: hence B too holds of no C – therefore walls do not breathe”. 
(78b13-28, Barnes’s translation, modified). 
Aristotle is presenting an attempted demonstration in which the cause is not stated (step [1]). 
Although “cause” does not go with any adjective there, I submit that Aristotle is talking about the 
cause which yields scientific understanding of the fact expressed in the conclusion of a 
demonstration: the appropriate or primary cause. Actually, he has just mentioned the notion of a 
primary cause (τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον) a few lines earlier: ‘this syllogism is of the reason why, for the 
primary cause [to proton aition] has been captured’ (78b3-4). Aristotle refers to the syllogism that 
explains why planets do not twinkle through the middle term ‘being near the Earth’, which he has 
contrasted with the syllogism in which one infers that planets are near the Earth by their non-
twinkling.  Thus, I argue that Aristotle’s use of “the cause” (τὸ αἴτιον) in APo 78b15, 16, 17 picks 10
up this same notion of a primary cause.   11
In step [1] Aristotle is talking about a pattern of explanation which will be spelled out in step 
[5] as the following Camestres syllogism: 
 More on this on section V.10
 According to Philoponus, Commentaria, 174.9-10, Alexander has understood Aristotle as referring to the προσεχὴς 11
αἰτία (proximate cause). Aristotle’s uses of τὸ αἴτιον (with no adjective) picks up the stricter notion of primary cause in 
many passages (75a35, 78a27, 85b25-6, A.Po 2.16).
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‘Everything which breathes is an animal’; 
‘Walls are not animals’; 
therefore, ‘Walls do not breathe’. 
Aristotle claims that such a syllogism does not capture the appropriate cause which would 
ultimately explain why walls do not breathe. Aristotle’s point has not been understood: he is not 
interested in a general principle about explanations which will allow one to infer positive causes 
from negative ones (and vice-versa), nor is he exclusively concerned with negative causes 
expressed in second-figure syllogisms.  It might be useful to give a survey of the claims I will 12
argue for in what follows: 
- in steps [2] and [3] Aristotle is introducing a requirement which a cause must satisfy for 
being the appropriate and primary cause to explain a given explanandum; step [2] implies the 
requirement in contrast with the particular counter-example at stake, but step [3] moves to a general 
introduction of the requirement: Aristotle presents the logical features which a cause must display 
in order to be the primary cause capable of providing strictly scientific understanding about a given 
explanandum; (these logical features are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for a cause to 
be primary).   13
 See Barnes, Posterior, 157-8; Mignucci, Analitici, 197. Philoponus, Commentaria (176.8-177.15, especially 12
176.24-26, 177.1-4) thinks that Aristotle’s point is that a cause for a negative fact must be expressed in the second 
figure. Ross, Analytics, 553, gets the essentials of Aristotle’s point (the same for McKirahan, Principles, 213-5), but is 
far from disentangling the argument and understanding its general reach. On the other hand, it is surely a 
disappointment that many scholars addressing Aristotle’s theory of explanation avoid this passage.
 Aristotle is not saying that wall’s not being an animal does not give any explanation of wall’s not breathing. He is 13
saying that our Camestres does not capture the primary cause (or ‘the precise ground’, as phrased by Ross, Analytics,
553) which would give scientific understanding of walls’ not breathing – and this is compatible with the obvious truth 
that our Camestres gives at least some explanation of its explanandum. Aristotle is not relying on a ‘general principle 
about explanation’ (Barnes, Posterior, 157) that would allow him to pass from any explanation of negative facts 
through negations to the explanation of the correlated positive fact through affirmations. His point is more specific: he 
is stating a requirement for a cause to be the primary one for its explanandum. 
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- in step [4], Aristotle explains what was implied in [2], namely, why the Camestres-syllogism 
suggested at step [1] and spelled out in step [5] fails at satisfying the requirement. Then, the 
Camestres-syllogism at [5] is employed as a foil for highlighting the requirement. 
Let me develop these points as I proceed to step [2] of T1: 
“[2] εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦ µὴ ἀναπνεῖν αἴτιον, ἔδει τὸ 
ζῷον εἶναι αἴτιον τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν” (78b16-17). 
“if this [=wall’s not being an animal] were the cause of [wall’s] not breathing, being an 
animal would have to be the cause of [wall’s] breathing” (78b16-17, my translation). 
It is clear not only from the previous context but also from the next steps in Aristotle’s 
discussion that τοῦτο at 78b16 means ‘wall’s not being an animal’: otherwise, the contrast between 
τοῦτο and τὸ ζῷον (translated as ‘being an animal’) would be pointless. It is also important to note 
that τὸ ζῷον in this context works as a short-hand for a predicate attributed to wall (see Barnes’s 
translation). What is most important is that Aristotle is using a counterfactual mode  in [2], and this 14
fact points to step [4], which I translate as follows: 
[4] ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν οὕτως ἀποδεδοµένων οὐ συµβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν ἀναπνεῖ ζῷον. 
(78b21-3). 
“But what was said does not obtain in the cases introduced (or explained) in that way: indeed, 
not every animal breathes” (78b21-3, my translation). 
 There is no ἄν particle in the apodosis etc., but Philoponus (Commentaria, 174.26-28), Ross (Analytics, 551, 553) 14
and most translators (Barnes, Posterior, 20; Mignucci, Analitici, 39; G. R. G. Mure, Posterior Analytics, in D. Ross 
(ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle Translated into English (Oxford, 1925); P. Pellegrin, Aristote - Seconds 
Analytiques (Paris, 2005), 133) are right in translating or paraphrasing the sentence as a counterfactual. 
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Now, ‘what was said’ refers exactly to the requirement expounded in steps [2] and [3], so that 
Aristotle’s point is that the Camestres-syllogism to be spelled out in [5] and already implied in [1] 
and [2] (‘the cases explained in that way’) falls short of satisfying the requirement and so works as 
a foil to it. Thus – coming back to [2] – Aristotle’s use of the counterfactual mode in step [2] 
presupposes the requirement and actually states that the present foil-case does not meet it. 
The requirement is then explicated in the step [3] of T1, which is the most difficult to unpack. 
The main difficulties involved in this step are the following: (i) what ‘the negation’ (ἡ ἀπόφασις) 
and ‘the affirmation’ (ἡ κατάφασις) are referring to, (ii) whether Aristotle’s point is or is not 
restricted to negative explanations formulated in the second figure; (iii) why Aristotle needs [3b], 
which seems a redundant repetition of [3a].   15
There are two ways of handling difficulty (i). A first option is to take the expression ‘the 
negation’ as an abbreviated reference to the negative sentence in which ‘animal’ is denied of ‘wall’ 
and, similarly, to take ‘the affirmation’ as an abbreviated reference to the affirmative sentence in 
which ‘animal’ would be universally predicated of ‘wall’.  In this way, step [3] would remain 16
entirely in the counterfactual mode: Aristotle would be indirectly introducing the requirement for 
being a primary cause by reporting a case in which the requirement is not fulfilled. The expression 
οἷον (‘i.e.’) would be indicating, then, a mere rephrasing of the same point made at step [2]. 
A second option is to take the expression ‘the negation’ not as an abbreviated reference to the 
specific negative sentence in which ‘animal’ is denied of ‘wall’, but as an abbreviated reference to a 
general pattern of sentence in which a term (expressing a cause) is denied of another term – as if 
Aristotle has dropped the concrete terms (‘wall’, ‘animal’, ‘breathe’) and had in mind schematic 
letters (‘C’, ‘B’, ‘A’) instead. A similar story will apply to ‘the affirmation’. In this option, Aristotle 
 Another issue is (iv) why Aristotle has shifted from αἴτιον to αἰτία. But this shift is not important to my claims here. 15
Aristotle just moves from the notion of an explanatory factor to the notion of an explanation.
 A Greek article can have demonstrative force in many contexts, and it might be misleading to translate it with a non-16
committal ‘the’ when the context makes it clear that the referent is a given one. See for instance EN 1144a28 (with 
dunamis).
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will be extracting a general point from his previous example. The expression hoion (‘i.e.’) should 
be taken not as introducing a mere rephrasing, but a sort of generalising clarification.  17
Anyway, it is clear from the context that Aristotle has a syllogistic framework in mind: 
‘ἀπόφασις’ (‘the negation’) and ‘κατάφασις’ (‘the affirmation’) pick up particularly the denial/
affirmation of a middle term (be it the schematic letter B or a concrete term replacing B) and 
‘ὑπάρχειν’ (‘being attributed’) and ‘µὴ ὑπάρχειν’ (‘not being attributed’) refer to the major term’s 
being or not being attributed to something (either to the schematic letter C or to a concrete term 
replacing C). Thus, the middle term can be attributed or not to the minor term, and the major term 
can be attributed or not to the minor term: Aristotle is particularly concerned with settling whether 
the attributive tie between the middle term and the minor term is a ground for the major’s being 
attributed (or not) to the minor term. Aristotle’s issue is whether and how the minor premise (B-C) 
grounds the conclusion (A-C). 
Now, according to the first option, the translation of step [3] will be the following (let me call 
it ‘Version 1’ of step [3]): 
‘[3a] οἷον εἰ ἡ ἀπόφασις αἰτία τοῦ 
µὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ κατάφασις τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, […] – [3b] ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ κατάφα- 
σις τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ ἀπόφασις τοῦ µὴ ὑπάρχειν.’ (78b17-21). 
Version 1: ‘[3a] i.e. if animal’s being denied of walls were the cause of breathing’s not being 
attributed to walls, then animal’s being asserted of walls would be the cause of breathing’s being 
attributed to walls [...], [3b] and, similarly, if animal’s being asserted of walls were the cause of 
 In favour of taking [3a] as a generalisation is the fact that [3a*] introduces a different but equivalent example, as if 17
Aristotle were concerned with saying: ‘don’t stick with the particularity of my single example: I have generalised my 
point: and see another concrete example to better understand me’. The fact that ἀσύµµετρα has the negation transposed 
into the predicate is irrelevant. Aristotle relies on the translatability of ‘hot and cold being incommensurate’ into ‘hot 
and cold not being commensurate’. For discussion, see M. Ferejohn, The origins of Aristotelian science [Origins] (New 
Haven, 1991), 136-7.
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breathing’s being attributed to walls, then animal’s being denied of walls would be the cause of 
breathing’s not being attributed to walls’. (78b17-21, my translation) 
According to the second option for taking step [3], its translation (let it be called “Version 2”) 
will be something like this: 
Version 2:  ‘[3a] i.e. if B’s being denied of C is the cause of A’s not being attributed to C, then 
B’s being asserted of C would be the cause of A being attributed to C [...], [3b] and, similarly, if B’s 
being asserted of C is the cause of A’s being attributed to C, then B’s being denied of C would be the 
cause of A not being attributed to C’. (78b17-21, my translation).  18
According to Version 2, steps [3a] and [3b] describe some logical features of the general 
notion of a primary cause. In Version 2, only the consequents of the conditionals advanced in [3a] 
and [3b] must be taken in the counterfactual mode, whereas the antecedent must be formulated in 
the indicative. I will explain later why there is such a difference between the antecedent and the 
consequent. For the time being, I remark that in Version 1, on its turn, explicit reference to the 
attempted demonstration of why walls do not breathe requires the antecedent of the conditionals to 
be in the counterfactual mode too. Cases explained in this way – namely, following the pattern of 
the logical relations between the concrete terms of the Camestres-syllogism implied in [2] – 
illustrate the requirement by presenting a situation in which it is not satisfied. On the other hand, 
Version 2 attains more generality in expressing the requirement itself by avoiding concrete terms. In 
what follows I will argue that Version 2 should be adopted. 
Let me spell out the requirement. Take the Camestres-schema, which is presupposed by 
Aristotle in step [2] and actually used in step [5] of T1: 
‘Every A is B’; 
 I thanks an OSAP’s anonymous referee for improving my formulation here.18
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‘No C is B’; 
therefore, ‘No C is A’. 
‘Its negation’ (in step [3a]) might be taken to refer to the minor premise of the Camestres-
schema: this premise denies that B is attributed to C. And ‘not being attributed” (78b17-18) is a 
short-hand for ‘A’s not being attributed to C’, which is what the conclusion expresses. Thus, when 
Aristotle says (in the antecedent of [3a]) that ‘its negation is an aitia for not being attributed’, he 
thereby describes a logical property of the primary cause as it can be displayed in a Camestres-
schema:  if B is the primary cause of A, then the fact that B is denied of something (as it is of C in 19
the minor premise of the Camestres) entails the denial of the attribute it primarily explains: A is not 
attributed to C either. Let me provisionally call this logical property the first formal condition for 
being a primary cause.   
But this, of course, is not the end of the story. The first formal condition, as depicted in the 
previous paragraph, is incomplete in itself: it is only a logical property shared by many other middle 
terms which deliver sound Camestres syllogisms but are not primary causes. This is why the second 
part of [3a] is strictly needed: it works as a second half of the requirement for primary causes: ‘its 
affirmation is an aitia for being attributed’. Now, this second half of the requiment is what precisely 
fails in our Camestres-case about wall’s not breathing. If things were contrary to what is stated in its 
minor premise, i.e., if walls were animals, this would not entail that walls would breathe – for, in 
Aristotle’s view, there are some species of animals that do not breathe. The inference from walls’s 
being animals to walls’s breathing would be a ‘fallacy of the consequent’ (cf. Soph. Ref. 167b 1-3) 
in the second figure. In order to get a sound inference, the major premise should be convertible: ‘all 
animals breathe” should also be true. But this sentence is false in Aristotle’s view.   20
 The Camestres-schema is useful for displaying the logical property Aristotle is highlighting, but this does not imply 19
that Aristotle’s point is restricted to second-figure syllogisms. More on this later.
 Cf. Resp. 470b9-10; Parts of animals 678b1, 697a21.20
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Thus, the conjunction of the first and the second halves of the requirement implies that a 
primary cause reciprocates with the attribute it is meant to explain.  What one gets from picking up 21
together the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional expressed in [3a] is a schema stating 
that B and A are convertible. But this convertibility is meant as a condition for primary causes, not 
as a general rule about any sort of explanation whatsoever (pace Barnes, Posterior, 157). 
Let me spell this out carefully. First, take the antecedent itself (‘C’s not being B is the aitia of 
C’s not being A’) as a conditional such as ‘if C is not B, then C is not A’ and translate it into 
predicate calculus: 
[3a].(Antecedent): ∀x (¬Bx → ¬Ax). 
Take also the consequent (‘C’s being B is the aitia of C’s being A’) as a conditional (‘if C is B, 
then C is A’) and translate it into formal language: 
[3a].(Consequent): ∀x (Bx → Ax). 
Now, one should be very careful with employing such formalisations, for Aristotle is 
definitely not committed to a fallacy of conversion such as the following (let it be labelled as [3a*] 
for further reference): 
[3a*]: ∀x ((¬Bx → ¬Ax) → (Bx → Ax)). 
Aristotle’s point was never meant as an inference from the antecedent to the consequent of 
[3a*]. A reading of [3a] in terms of an intended inference would lead us to attribute a fallacy to 
Aristotle.  Now, it is clear that Aristotle did not meant [3a] as an inference valid for any 22
proposition whatsoever in general, but something restricted to explanations. However, even with 
such a restriction, one might be tempted to see [3a] as stating an inferential rule about explanations 
in general: a rule that would permit to infer from ‘not being B is an explanation of not being A’ to 
 For a similar result see Philoponus, Commentaria, 175.7-13, McKirahan, Principles, 214. On reciprocation of causal 21
relations, see APo 2.16-17, and Categories 12 (where the causal priority of a cause over its effect is compatible with the 
reciprocation in their mutual implication of being the case, 14b10-24).
 See Philoponus, Commentaria, 174.34-175.13 for such a charge and his defence of Aristotle.22
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‘being B is an explanation of being A’. This is what Barnes (Posterior, 157) has proposed. His 
paraphrase for [3a] is the following:  
(1) ‘If (∀x) (if not-Fx, then not-Fx because not-Gx) then (∀x) (if Fx, then Fx because Gx)’.
Barnes’s idea seems to be that, according to this ‘general principle about explanation’, once 
one gets an explanation of not-Fx in terms of not-Gx, one will be permitted to infer that Gx explains 
Fx. Barnes is right in saying that the principle is false. What Barnes has missed is that Aristotle has 
not meant [3a] as a general principle about any sort of explanation whatsoever. Aristotle is not 
interested in how one can infer new explanations from a previous one, he is rather specifying 
criteria for primary explanations:  [3a] spells out a logical condition for being a primary cause – 23
and a logical condition that is not sufficient for being a primary cause. Therefore, Aristotle’s point 
should rather be expressed in the following way (let it be labelled [3aPC], where the superscript ‘PC’ 
means that it is a condition for being a primary cause): 
[3aPC]: If B is the primary cause of A, then ∀x ((¬Bx → ¬Ax) & (Bx → Ax)).  24
And the conjunction in the consequent of [3aPC] can be packed into a bicondicional: 
 [3aPC]*: If B is the primary cause of A, then ∀x (Bx ↔ Ax). 
The antecedent in [3aPC], namely, ‘if B is the primary cause of A’, is supplied from the 
context. Philoponus (Commentaria, 175.7-13) is on the right track in taking Aristotle to be 
proposing a convertibility between the cause and what it causes. But Aristotle is more particularly 
concerned in T1 with showing that ‘cases explained in this way’ (78b21-2) – i.e., cases following 
 See McKirahan, Principles, 299, for a similar criticism against Barnes: Aristotle’s point is about demonstration 23
involving immediate principles, not about any sort of explanation. On the other hand, the amendment (2) which Barnes, 
Posterior, 158, advances might be true in itself – (= ‘If not-P is among the conditions explanatory of not-Q, then P is 
among the conditions explanatory of Q’) – but is not a correct exegesis of [3a].
 From [3b], one can get an equivalent formula matching Aristotle’s phrasing, namely, [3bPC]: ‘If B is the primary 24
cause of A, then ∀x ((Bx → Ax) & (¬Bx → ¬Ax))’. Now, since the order of the conjuncts does not matter, [3bPC] can be 
taken as equivalent to [3aPC]. But, then, why has Aristotle explicitly expressed [3b]? I will deal with this issue later on.
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the pattern of the logical relations between ‘animal’, ‘wall’ and ‘breathing’ – are not appropriate 
demonstrations because they fail to capture the primary cause.  He says that ‘the [attempted] 25
demonstration is of the that but not of the why’ (78b14). However, just a few lines earlier he has 
made clear that capturing the primary cause is the rationale that makes a syllogism what he calls a 
demonstration of the why: ‘and this syllogism is of the why, for the primary cause is 
captured’ (78b3-4).  He has explicated previously (in 78a26-38) how an attempted demonstration 26
can fail at capturing the primary cause in the case of convertible or coextensive terms.  When he 27
comes at 78b13-28, he shows a similar failure involving terms that are not coextensive – but he 
does so in such a way that coextensiveness comes out as a formal requirement for primary causes. 
What he is trying to describe and characterise in [3a] is the logical behaviour of a primary cause. 
Therefore, [3a] must be understood strictly as [3aPC], i.e., as something restricted to primary causes. 
III. Is Aristotle’s expression redundant in step [3b]? 
Another important issue about T1 is why Aristotle was not fully satisfied with step [3a], but 
has added the seemingly redundant step [3b]. We can shed a light on this issue by considering the 
syllogistic framework Aristotle employs. An important point is that the major premise of the 
Camestres-schema must be convertible in the case of primary causes: not only ‘every A is B’, but 
also ‘every B is A’ must be true. When the latter sentential schema also delivers a true sentence, its 
truth allows us to construct a sound Barbara showing that the ‘affirmation of the cause” (in the 
minor premise) is an aitia for the major term A to be attributed to C: 
 Even if the expression ‘cause of this sort’ (τοιαύτης αἰτίας, 78b23-4) refers particularly to negative causes to be 25
expressed in second-figure syllogisms, the relevant point is that they instantiate the notion of an ‘outside middle 
term’ (µέσον ἐξω, 78b13). i.e., causes that are not coextensive with their explananda (such as ‘animal’ is not 
coextensive with ‘breathing’) and thereby fail at being the primary ones.
 See Section II.26
 Aristotle is not explicit in 78a28-30 about primary causes – he has just said µή αἴτιον with no adjetive – but since the 27
case in 78a28-38 is complementary to the case in 78a39-b4 and since Aristotle says explicitly that the latter captures the 
primary cause, it is fair to infer that the first case (78a28-38) is one in which the terms are coextensive but the primary 
cause was not captured. 
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‘Every B is A’; 
‘Every C is B’; 
therefore, ‘Every C is A’. 
Now, Aristotle could never be suggesting that both the Barbara-schema and the Camestres-
schema should deliver sound syllogisms for the same minor term: the truth of ‘every C is A’ will be 
incompatible with the truth of ‘no C is A’ for any given interpretation of ‘C’. What Aristotle has 
meant is that, B being convertible with A (given that B is assumed as the primary cause of A), then 
if a Camestres-syllogism captures the appropriate cause to explain why a given C is not A, then a 
correlated Barbara-syllogism will correctly express the counterfactual situation confirming that C’s 
being B would have made C have the feature A: this is what Aristotle expresses in [3a]; and, 
conversely, if a Barbara-syllogism captures the appropriate cause for a given C’s being A, then a 
correlated Camestres-syllogism will correctly express the counterfactual situation confirming that, 
if C were not B, C would not be A: this is what is expressed in [3b]. This is why Aristotle spells out 
his requirement in a way that might seem redundant, but is actually needed within his conceptual 
framework – and we miss the point if we stick with our formal language with ‘x’ instead of ‘C’.  
Let us consider [3aPC]S, a syllogistic version of [3aPC] (the superscript ‘S’ indicates that the 
formula is meant only for syllogistic terms):  28
[3aPC]S: If B is the primary cause of A, then ∀C ((BeC → AeC) & (BaC → AaC)contrary-to-fact). 
There can also be obtained a syllogistic version for [3b]: 
[3bPC]S: If B is the primary cause of A, then ∀C ((BaC → AaC) & (BeC → AeC)contrary-to-fact). 
Consider [3aPC]S: no concrete instance of ‘C’ can satisfy both the antecedent of the first 
conditional (‘BeC → AeC’) and the antecedent of the second conditional (‘BaC → AaC’): that is 
 As I will show, it makes a difference whether we formulate the point with ‘x’ (standing for an individual of the 28
universal class) or with the schematic letter ‘C’ standing for a term able to be used as argument in a categorical form 
(this is what I mean by ‘syllogistic term’). I need not discuss this intricate issue. For a recent approach, see M. Malink 
Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic (Harvard, 2013), 46-8 ff. 
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why the second conditional must be taken in the would-be mode, as expressing a situation that does 
not actually obtain.  And the same sort of claim holds for [3bPC]S. Thus, this syllogistic 29
interpretation with the second conditional in the would-be mode depicts precisely what Aristotle has 
meant in [3a] and [3b]. If we stick with the conditionals formulated in our usual language – with ‘x’ 
referring to individuals of the universal class – [3b] will look as a redundant duplication of the point 
already made in [3a].  But a syllogistic version of [3a] with ‘C’ standing for a syllogistic term 30
requires [3b] as its counterpart – if only to dispel the misleading appearance that Aristotle was 
exclusively focused on negative primary causes and second-figure syllogisms. Aristotle’s underlying 
concern is a general point about primary causes, not restricted to negative causes. My interpretation 
does not hang on how the expression ‘cases in which the middle term has outside position’ (‘ἐφ᾽ ὧν 
τὸ µέσον ἔξω τίθεται’, 78b13) must be understood – whether as a sign that the ensuing discussion 
will focus exclusively on second-figure syllogisms or as pointing to middle terms failing the 
coextensiveness (or proximateness) requirement.  I do believe that the sentence at 78b13 should be 31
paraphrased in the following way: ‘furthermore, it happens the same [namely, one does not reach 
knowledge of the primary explanation] also in the cases where the middle term has more extension 
than required’ – and this is the way Philoponus, Commentaria, 174.3-21 has taken the expression 
(following Alexander). However, if one insists that the expression ‘cases in which the middle term 
has outside position’ (‘ἐφ᾽ ὧν τὸ µέσον ἔξω τίθεται’) at 78b13 must be taken as pointing to second-
figure syllogisms, my answer is that, even so, Aristotle only starts with second-figure syllogisms as 
 I am grateful to an OSAP’s referee for more clarity on this point, as well as for finding the right expression in the 29
formal notations.
 Barnes, Posterior, 157, has taken [3b] as simply the contrapositive of [3a] without explaining why Aristotle has 30
taken the pain of expressing it. On the other hand, Barnes’s formulation (‘If (∀x) (if not-Fx, then not-Fx because not-
Gx) then (∀x) (if Fx, then Fx because Gx)’) cleverly grasps the generality of Aristotle’s point with ‘if not-Fx’ as the 
antecedent  inside the antecedent of the conditional and ‘if Fx’ as the antecedent inside the consequent of the 
conditional. 
 Most intepretations are for the second option: Philoponus, Commentaria, 174.3-2; Ross, Analytics, 553; Barnes, 31
Posterior, 157; McKirahan, Principles, 215-6; Ferejohn, Origins, 136-7.
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a useful tool for highlighting the coextensiveness requirement for primary causes in general.  But 32
his point is a general one: if one starts with a given C that stands to B such that ‘BeC’ is true – this 
is [3a] –, then ‘BaC’ must be counterfactual; but if one starts with a given C that stands to B such 
that ‘BaC’ is true – this is [3b] –, then ‘BeC’ must be counterfactual. Had Aristotle had a different 
language at his disposal – for instance, a language capable of expressing coextensiveness –, he will 
not need to ‘duplicate’ his point with [3b].  33
To sum up, Aristotle’s underlying argument in steps [1]-[2] and [4] of T1 might be taken as a 
modus tollens on the basis of [3aPC]S: the case depicted in the Camestres-syllogism with the terms 
‘breathing’, ‘wall’ and ‘animal’ falsifies the consequent of [3aPC]S, since it verifies only one of the 
conjuncts which constitute that consequent – even if all walls were animals (counterfactual), it 
would not be true that all walls would be breathing things. Aristotle thereby concludes (or suggests) 
that the middle term ‘animal” cannot, then, be taken as the primary cause for explaining why walls 
do not breathe.  And [3bPC]S is in order where it is: [3bPC]S stresses that Aristotle’s point is not 34
restricted to negative causes formulated in the second-figure, but ranges over primary causes in 
general.  
IV. The coextensiveness requirement for primary causes: 
 In APr. 26b39, the expression points to second-figure syllogisms, but in 28a14-5, it points to third-figure syllogisms, 32
so it is not compelling to argue that Aristotle has used it in 78b13 to restrict his remarks to second-figure syllogisms 
(see Ross, Analytics, 553). It is not possible to settle this issue appealing to ‘κατὰ τὴν τῶν µέσων θέσιν’ at 78b32-3, 
since this expression can also be taken in different ways: as pointing to the syntatical difference in the position of the 
middle term in each figure, or as pointing to the choice of concrete middle terms that have different levels of 
explanatory relevance (I prefer the last option).
 Aristotle uses the verb ‘ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι’ to mean that two terms are coextensive with each other, but my point is 33
that the four categorical forms available to express predicative sentences in his syllogistics do not enable him to express 
coextensiveness in any straightforward way. Aristotle has discussed what happens with the valid moods when terms are 
coextensive (in APr 2.5-7), but this does not modify my point. I thank an OSAP referee for more clarity on this point.
 For a different approach, see Ferejohn, Origins, 136-7. On Ferejohn’s view, Aristotle’s worry is with causes that are 34
too remote to explain (as if the “Anacharsis case” at 78b28-31 presented the central concern), whereas on my view 
Aristotle is more specifically saying that only coextensive causes can be primarily explanatory. It is important to stress 
that causes can be non-remote without being coextensive: Ferejohn’s view will not cover them.
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Let me focus on the ‘antecedent’ or first half of [3a] – which is equivalent to the ‘consequent’ 
or second half of [3b]: ‘its negation is aitia of not being attributed’. This phrase advances by itself a 
logical requirement for being a primary cause:  
(R1) B’s being attributed to a given C must be a necessary (sine qua non) condition for C’s 
being A. 
Similarly, the ‘consequent’ or second half of [3a] – which is equivalent to the ‘antecedent’ or 
first half of [3b] – expresses by itself another logical requirement for being a primary cause: ‘its 
affirmation is aitia of being attributed’. This implies the following:  
(R2) B’s being attributed to a given C must be a sufficient condition for C’s being A. 
And R1 together with R2 results in the requirement that B must be coextensive or convertible 
with A.  35
T1 is made harder to disentangle by all the circumlocutions of Aristotle’s. He starts with a 
counterfactual mode to present his requirement by means of a foil that does not satisfy it (step [2]). 
But the expression of the requirement itself involves a counterfactual mode when interpreted with a 
triplet of syllogistic terms, since there could be no interpretation of ‘C’ such that B would be 
asserted and denied of C at the same time. Such an entangled expression was due to the limits of his 
syllogistic language, which (besides other things) cannot capture coextensiveness as a single 
categorical form. When the two conjuncts encapsulated in the consequent of [3aPC] are interpreted 
in the syllogistic framework as [3aPC]S (depicting relations between minor premises and 
conclusions), it is not possible to express both in syllogisms that are simultaneously sound. Thus, 
[3a] and [3b] are strictly needed to cover different triplets of terms for which either the negation or 
the affirmation will actually (i.e., not counterfactually) obtain. It was Aristotle’s concern with a 
 Ross, Analytics, 553, has seen that coextensiveness is at stake (as something involved in what is the ‘precise ground’ 35
of the explanandum). See also McKirahan, Principles, 214, 299. But both scholars are far from explicating what is 
going on in each step of the text – nor do they explain why Aristotle needs [3b] after [3a]. Ferejohn, Formal, is very 
sympathetic to the coextensiveness requirement for primary causes, but he does not address 78b13-28 directly.
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general point – not restricted to negative causes expressed in second-figure syllogisms – that has led 
him to [3b], which is not a mere or redundant duplication of [3a]. 
Let me spell out again how the argument goes. Step [3a] starts with generalizing from cases 
like the Camestres-syllogism implied in step [2] and formulated in [5]. Requirement R1 is satisfied: 
since walls are not animals and being an animal is a necessary condition for breathing (thus 
satisfying R1), it follows that walls do not breathe. However, requirement R2 is not satisfied in that 
case, and this is a sign that the Camestres-syllogism formulated in step [5] fails at stating the 
primary cause and thereby falls short of being an appropriate demonstration. However, there are 
still the cases in which the situation will be the reverse: requirement R2 is satisfied, where 
requirement R1 is not. Such cases can be depicted as sound Barbara-syllogisms. For instance: since 
humans are mammals and being a mammal is a sufficient condition for being mortal (thus satisfying 
R2), it follows that humans are mortal. However, R1 will not be satisfied, since humans could still 
be mortal even if they were not mammals – in short, being a mammal is not a necessary condition 
for being mortal and, consequently, being a mammal cannot be the primary cause of being mortal. 
Therefore, Aristotle’s point in [3b], far from being a redundant repetition of the point made at [3a], 
is welcome in context: Aristotle thereby stresses that his requirement about the logical features of 
primary causes is a general one, not restricted to the negative causes as depicted in second-figure 
syllogisms.  Now, this also shows that steps [3a]-[3b] are not a mere rephrasing of the particular 36
point made at step [2] about wall’s not being animals, but are rather a generalisation aiming at 
formulating universal requirements for primary causes. Therefore, Version 2 of step [3] is preferable 
than Version 1. 
 Other intepretations, such as found in Ross, Analytics, 557, and McKirahan, Principles, 214, cannot account for [3b] 36
in any interesting way and, furthermore, restrict Aristotle’s point to negative causes. The same for Philoponus, 
Commentaria, 174-7: although he understand Aristotle’s point about convertibility between causes and effects 
(174.34-175.4), as he goes on (176.8-177.15, especially 176.24-26, 177.1-4) he takes Aristotle as trying to establish that 
a cause for a negative fact must be expressed in the second figure.
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Once the reasons for the ‘duplication’ in [3b] become clear, the full logical requirement for 
being a primary cause can be expressed in the following way: 
Thesis = [3aPC]*: If B is the primary cause of A, then ∀x (Bx ↔ Ax).  
Now, the entailment in the Thesis itself does not convert: this means that the convertibility 
between B (the cause) and A (that of which it is the cause) is only a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for B to qualify as the primary cause of A. In order to be a primary cause, a given middle 
term B must also present an explanatory appropriateness which, for Aristotle, cannot be reduced to 
its convertibility with the effect.  37
V. Beyond the formal features of primary causes: 
It is of utmost importance to stress my last remark. I do claim that Aristotle considers R1 and 
R2 as joint conditions for being a primary cause. But I do not claim that Aristotle reduces the notion 
of primary cause to the combination of R1 and R2. Conditions R1 and R2 are just formal or logical 
features of a primary cause. Now, the first half of APo 2.13 (besides many other texts) makes it 
clear that these two conditions cannot exhaust the requirements for being a primary cause – since, 
for instance, not only not twinkling but also being near the Earth as attributes of planets satisfy both 
conditions, although one of them is the cause of the other but not vice-versa (see also APo 2.16, 
especially 98b16-19).  38
Aristotle surely has some additional criteria for sorting out primary causes, besides these 
logical conditions. These additional criteria rest on the notion of explanatory relevance and cannot 
be cashed out in formal or logical features of their own. This is not the place for a full discussion of 
 As I will explore in the next section, Aristotle’s point about irreducibility was established in 78a26-b11 and in APo 37
2.16, 98b16-9. See R. J. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford, 1998), 166-7; 
McKirahan, Principles, 214-6; Ferejohn, Formal, 76-80. For a recent approach to the relation between coextensiveness 
and causation, see A. M. Leroi, The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science (London, 2014), 128-30. 
 See M. Ferejohn, ‘The Immediate Premises of Aristotelian Demonstration’ [‘Immediate’], Ancient Philosophy 14 38
(1994), 79-97 at 84-86; Ferejohn, Formal, 77-80; McKirahan, Principles, 214-6; N. Stein, ‘Pluralism’, 135-6; K. 
Koslicki ‘Essence, necessity and explanation’, in T. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, Cambridge, 
2012),198-201; Goldin, ‘Circular Justification and Explanation in Aristotle’, Phronesis 58 (2013), 201-2.
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these additional criteria, but I will sketch their main outlines. The first and main point is the one that 
has already been implied in the previous paragraphs: the explanatory appropriateness of a primary 
cause is not marked by any logical asymmetry with its effect: as the effect can be soundly deduced 
from the cause, in the same way the cause can be soundly deduced from the effect (see 78a26-b11, 
98b4-24). This means that explanatory appropriateness cannot be reduced to any logical property of 
a cause. Secondly, the explanatory appropriateness of a primary cause has a direct link with 
definitional priority: the primary cause is an important factor in the definiens account of the thing it 
is the cause of, but not the other way around (cf. 98b21-24).  The definitional priority gives 39
expression to the claim that the fully appropriate explanation of X is tantamount with understanding 
the essence of X (see 90a14-23, 31-4, 93a4). Thirdly, the explanatory appropriateness of a primary 
cause is also marked by the fact that it makes a series of why-questions come to an end: once the 
primary cause has been reached, there is no more sense in pursuing why-questions about the 
explanandum at stake (cf. 85b27-38). Fourthly, although Aristotle does not ever offer a conceptual 
analysis of the notion of primary cause or the notion of explanatory appropriateness, he has relied 
on the intuitiveness of some uncontroversial examples to put us on the right track: it is because 
planets are near the Earth that they do not twinkle, but not the other way around (cf. 78a36-8); it is 
because the Moon is spherical that it waxes and wanes in the way it does, but not the other way 
around (78b8-10); the Earth’s interposition makes the Moon deprived of light, but Moon’s privation 
of light does not make the Earth stay in the middle (98b17-19). 
Instead of substantiating these outlines, my main concern in the remainder of this paper is to 
highlight that the notion of primary cause as depicted in 78b13-28 fits very well with another 
feature of Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration in APo. 
 The word αἴτιον is not accompanied by any adjective in 98b21-24, but τὸ αἴτιον in some contexts refers to what I am 39
calling the primary cause, namely: the cause that delivers the appropriate explanation and thereby scientific 
understanding of its explanandum. 
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VI. Primary Cause, Coextensiveness and Katholou Predication: 
My interpretation allows us to gain a better understanding of Aristotle’s insistence on 
coextensiveness between terms in a scientific explanation. Coextensiveness is the formal feature of 
the stricter notion of katholou introduced in APo 1.4, 73b26 ff. Of course, this notion has also 
intensional features which are mostly relevant in Aristotle’s theory, but all I need to say now is that 
coextensiveness between B- and A-terms is indeed an important requirement for scientific 
explanations.  Aristotle also insists on coextensiveness between C- and A-terms at 74a1 ff. – which 40
implies coextensiveness between the three terms of the demonstration – but let me keep this further 
complication out of my present case.  Some scholars have said or implied that the notion of 41
coextensive or commensurate katholou introduced at APo 1.4, 73b26 ff. is a peculiarity confined to 
those specific passages with no important role to play in Aristotle’s theory. Ross (Analytics, 523) 
has said that ‘this strict sense of katholou is, perhaps, found nowhere else in Aristotle. Usually the 
word is used in the sense of kata pantos simply’. Barnes (Posterior, 118) refers to it as a ‘singular 
sense’. As it stands, this is a remark about terminology, which I take to be wrong on its own.  But 42
the mistake is to assume or infer that the notion of commensurate katholou has no major use in 
Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. 
 I disagree with R. Smith, ‘Immediate propositions and Aristotle’s proof theory’, Ancient Philosophy 6 (1984), 47-68 40
at 63: “we have no idea how he finally resolved the problem of fitting convertible terms into sciences: it is possible that 
he abandoned them in despair, [..]. or that he simply lost interest in the whole enterprise when its difficulties became too 
great”. I rather agree with Ferejohn, ‘Immediate’, 85-6; McKirahan, Principles, 214 and Ferejohn, Formal, 83-90. Sure, 
coextensiveness is not the end of the story (more on this below), since there still might be intensional gaps in an 
attempted demonstration with coextensive terms (see P. S. Hasper, ‘Sources of delusion in Analytica Posteriora I 5’, 
Phronesis 51 (2006), 252-284 at 280-1, and Angioni, ‘Definition’, 86-88). A difficulty stems from the fact that, in APo 
1.3, 73a17-8, Aristotle has said that coextensive terms are rare in demonstrations (‘ἐπειδὴ ὀλίγα τοιαῦτα ἐν ταῖς 
ἀποδείξεσι’). I cannot adress this difficulty here, but I do not believe that 73a17-8 jeopardizes my interpretation. Many 
things depend on how ‘ἀποδείξεις’ should be taken in 73a18. I take Aristotle to be describing what his adversaries 
would have to admit: for them, there is circular and reciprocal demonstration, but at the same time they take 
demonstrations as ranging over any sort of terms (as Aristotle has done with ‘demonstrations’ in his syllogistics), not 
only over coextensive terms. I thank an OSAP referee for stressing the need to mention 73a17-18. 
 Coextensiveness between the three terms seems to be the concern in APo 1.4-5, whereas in APo 1.7-8 Aristotle 41
considers prominent cases where coextensiveness between the major and the middle is good enough: the subordinate 
sciences (1.7); application of theorems to particular instances (1.8) and cases like the lunar eclipse (1.8).
 Katholou has the ‘strict sense’ throughout chapters 1.4-5, 1.24 and 2.16 of APo (as well as in 1.33, 88b31, see L. 42
Angioni, ‘Knowledge and Opinion about the Same Thing in APo A-33’, Dois Pontos 10 (2013), 255-90). See also 
75b21; 87b30, 33, 33, 39; 88a2-6, 14; 90a28, 30.
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First, coextensiveness between the A- and the B-term is an important feature of the 
appropriate demonstrations depicted in APo 78a39-b10. One might be tempted to say that 
coextensiveness should not be taken as the paradigmatic case. Aristotle has picked up cases 
involving coextensive terms in order to stress that the explanatory appropriateness of a cause is not 
reducible to being a necessary and sufficient condition to deduce the explanandum. Once this thesis 
has been established, Aristotle might proceed with other examples in which the terms are not 
coextensive with each other. One might pursue this same line of argument concerning APo 2.16, a 
chapter in which, examining the logical relations between cause and effect, Aristotle concludes that 
‘also the middle term in these cases must be equal to that of which it is the cause, i.e., must convert’ 
(98b35-36). The expression ‘in these cases’ refers exactly to cases in which the explanandum at 
stake is a commensurate feature attributed to its proper subject. One might then argue that ‘these 
cases’ are peculiar cases and nothing guarantees that they must be taken as central cases.  
However, this line of argument overlooks the fact that APo 2.16 is a chapter devoted to 
examine the logical relations between the cause and that of which the cause is cause. The chapter 
starts by asking whether there is a relation of mutual entailment between cause and effect (98a35-
b5) and, having established that there is such a relation (98b5-16), argues that the asymmetry 
between cause and effect is compatible with that logical relation (98b16-24). From this it clearly 
follows that the explanatory appropriateness of a primary cause cannot be reduced to this relation of 
mutual entailment. It is not a coincidence that this string of claims matches with the argument 
developed at APo 1.13, 78a28-b11, which is another chapter mainly concerned with clarifying what 
being a cause delivering a proper demonstration amounts to. It does not seem reasonable to say that 
central examples and central arguments in both official treatments of causes and their logical 
relations to their effects in APo should not be taken as the paradigmatic case for scientific 
demonstration – especially because further evidence is furnished by Aristotle’s conspicuous 
insistence on coextensiveness and katholou predications in chapters 1.4-5. And Aristotle coherently 
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employs the terminology introduced in APo 1.4 when he characterizes the mutual entailment or the 
coextensiveness between causes and explananda at APo 2.16:  
T2: “whenever the explanandum [problema] is a commensurate universal [katholou], then the 
cause is also a whole, and that of which it is the cause is a commensurate universal? For instance, 
leaf-shedding is confined to a given whole, even if there are species of it, and it is a commensurate 
universal [katholou] for those – be it plants or plants of a specific sort. Consequently, also the 
middle term in these cases must be equal to that of which it is the cause, i.e., must 
convert” (98b32-6, my translation).  
There are many controversial intricacies in this passage, but it is clear that it confirms what 
Aristotle has established in T1: the primary cause delivering the appropriate explanation for a given 
explanandum must be (when put in the triadic framework of syllogistic demonstration) a middle 
term coextensive with the A-term (and, in most cases, coextensive with the C-term too). And this 
means that: (i) the primary cause is a necessary and sufficient condition for its explanandum to 
obtain (and vice-versa), although (ii) its explanatory appropriateness cannot be reduced to its being 
a necessary and sufficient condition for its explanandum to obtain. This is the Thesis.  43
Furthermore, my interpretation about the requirements for being a primary cause is also suited 
to Aristotle’s notion of causal priority as described in Categories 14b10-22.  All I need here is to 44
reamrk that the relevant sort of causal priority (which, of course, requires some asymmetry between 
cause and effect) is perfectly compatible with logical convertibility (or reciprocability) between 
 Furthermore, coextensiveness (besides other things) is also implied in APo 1.24, a chapter concerned with 43
establishing that universal demonstrations are superior to partial demonstrations. As a quick survey of the examples is 
enough to settle, the contrast in APo 1.24 involves two kinds of Barbara-demonstrations, one (the “universal”) in which 
the A-term (2R) is a commensurate universal of the C-term (triangle), and another (the “particular”) in which the C-term 
(isosceles) does not exhaust the extension of the A-term (2R).
 On this point see M. Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Oxford, 2011), 242.44
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cause and effect, and such convertibility, when cashed out in the syllogistic framework, amounts to 
coextensiveness between B- and A-terms and to mutual entailment between the minor premise and 
the conclusion of Barbara and Camestres syllogisms. This is enough to strengthen the case for the 
claim that the notion of a primary cause and its logical feature of being coextensive with that of 
which it is the cause is not a sui generis peculiarity confined to a weird paragraph in APo 1.13, but 
plays a central role in Aristotle’s overall theory of demonstration. 
VII. Conclusion: 
I have shown that 78b13-28, far from being a desperately convoluted passage committed to a 
false principle about explanation, is a coherent argument in which Aristotle presents logical 
requirements for being a primary cause. I have also shown that the seemingly redundancy of 
Aristotle’s expression is rather his way of making a general point about primary causes which is not 
restricted to either negative causes or second-figure syllogisms. The requirements are in accordance 
with another feature of Aristotle’s theory of scientific demonstration, namely, with the notion of a 
commensurate universal as developed in APo 1.4. I have not discussed the important intensional 
features of this notion, because it was enough for my point to focus on its extensional feature: being 
a commensurate universal includes (but does not collapse into) the satisfaction of requirements R1 
and R2 for being the appropriate cause for a given explanandum. I hope to have shown that passage 
78b13-28, in expounding R1 and R2 as logical criteria for being a primary cause, makes an 
important contribution to Aristotle’s overall project in the APo.   45
 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented in Coimbra (‘III International Aristotle Seminar: Causation in Greek and 45
Medieval Philosophy’, March 2011), Campinas, (Conference ‘Questions on Causality in Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics’, October 2012), and Helsinki (Workshop ‘Aristotelian Themes in Dependence, Modality and Essence’, 
January 2013). On those occasions, I have benefited from comments, criticisms and suggestions from David Charles, 
Nathanael Stein, Carlo Natali, David Bronstein, Breno Zuppolini, Rodrigo Guerizoli, Michail Peramatzis, Miira 
Tuominen, Tuomas Tahko, Benjamin Schneider, Mika Perälä and others. I am grateful to Alan Code, Adam Crager, 
Klaus Corcilius, Laura Castelli, Edgar Marques, Raphael Zillig, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Henry Mendell for informal 
discussions about the main point of this paper. I also thanks the anonymous referees for helpful comments, and Victor 
Caston for suggestions that improved the style of the paper.
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